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THE DIRECTOR DUTY OF CARE IN QATAR
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In this age of globalization, cross-border investment and intense
competition for capital, comparative corporate governance is an
increasingly important topic. This Article examines and analyzes the duty
of care for directors of publicly-traded companies, comparing Qatari law
with Delaware law. It finds that Qatari law on the duty of care is deficient
in several respects. Under current Qatari law, directors are liable for duty
of care violations for “mistaken” business decisions. Neither gross
negligence nor something more than mere negligence is required.
Moreover, Qatari law makes these duties non-exculpatory. Thus, in
comparison with Delaware, Qatari director obligations are riskier to
directors in terms of personal liability and may discourage the most
qualified people from becoming directors. Qatar would greatly benefit
from modifications to its duty of care law. Specifically, Qatar should enact
a business judgment rule (“BJR”) which is vital to creating a balanced
risk-taking environment. Qatar’s Companies Law should be amended to
include the BJR and should articulate the misconduct necessary to rebut
the BJR. The threshold of such conduct should be gross negligence or a
business decision for which there is no rational basis. Mere mistake or
negligence alone should not be sufficient to impose liability. In addition,
Qatar should consider allowing shareholders to approve exculpatory
clauses which would insulate directors from liability for duty of care
violations based upon conduct where there is no bad faith, self-interest or
disloyalty. Doing so would encourage companies to hire the most qualified
directors and would encourage the prudent risk-taking that is the hallmark
of the world’s most successful corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
In this age of globalization, cross-border investment in stock markets,
and intense competition for capital, comparative corporate governance is an
increasingly important topic for governments, international financial
institutions, practicing attorneys, scholars, and students. This Article
analyzes the duty of care for directors of publicly-traded companies,
comparing Qatari law with that of Delaware.
Qatar, once a pearl fishing mecca, has become—relatively quickly—a
wealthy, strategically located country in the Persian Gulf that hosts an
extensive United States military presence.1 Indeed, the once-classified
1. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31718, QATAR:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2014) (“In 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the
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United States Combined Air and Space Operations Center, the American
military command center for the Persian Gulf, is located in Qatar.2 In recent
years, United States-Qatar relations have grown increasingly close
notwithstanding policy differences with respect to terrorism and “issues
related to regional security, human rights, political reform, and labor
conditions.”3 Therefore, studying Qatari law to the end of improving Qatari
corporate governance is particularly salient. A stable, economically strong
Qatar serves American interests.
Of Qatar’s current population of approximately two million people,
roughly fifteen percent are Qatari citizens.4 The remainder of Qatar’s
residents are foreign nationals and immigrant laborers.5 In recent years,
Qatar has benefitted from strong financial growth and the modernization of
its economy and infrastructure6 which were proximately caused by its
emergence as a global leader in energy production—particularly natural gas
liquids.7 Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, which invests much of Qatar’s

Middle East moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase southwest
of Doha, the Qatari capital.”).
2. See Thom Shanker, Hagel Lifts Veil on Major Military Center in Qatar, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/world/middleeast/hagel-lifts-veil-on-major-military-centerin-qatar.html?_r=0 (“The highly classified American facility, officially called the Combined Air and
Space Operations Center, coordinated all of the attack and surveillance missions for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan—and would be equally critical if an American president decided that only bombs and
missiles could halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It hosts liaison officers from 30 allies in Europe and the
Persian Gulf.”).
3. See BLANCHARD, supra note 1, at 17.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.
6. See Ibrahim Ibrahim & Frank Harrigan, Qatar’s Economy: Past, Present and Future,
QSCIENCE CONNECT, Sept. 17, 2012, at 1, 2 (“Qatar’s economic ascent of recent years has few
parallels . . . Since 2000, Qatar has grown faster than any other economy, and it now ranks among the
top flight of countries in terms of its income per capita. Growth in oil and gas revenues has afforded
higher living standards and rising consumer spending among Qataris. But a significant portion of
hydrocarbon income has been saved, and the debts accumulated in the 1990s, as Qatar invested in its
hydrocarbon’s industry, have now been largely amortized. Qatar’s generous surpluses have funded a
range of investments. To meet the needs of a growing economy and larger population, Qatar has spent
prodigiously on expanding and upgrading economic and social infrastructure.”).
7. Id. (“Qatar is now the largest exporter of LNG and GTLs in the world, with a supply chain
that spans the globe. Downstream, Qatar is building new industries from scratch, such as polyethylene,
which add value to its low-cost feedstock. And though gas has now taken over the reins, oil continues to
make a significant contribution to exports and to fiscal revenues. Qatar is now reliably serving global
energy markets”).

2. SLAWOTSKY TRUBY (DO NOT DELETE)

340

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/9/2016 4:03 PM

Vol. 26:337

budgetary surplus, manages approximately $256 billion in assets8 and has
acquired both stakes in large companies and trophy real estate assets.9
However, Qatari ambition is not limited to carbon-based wealth;
rather, Qatar’s leadership envisions a diversified knowledge-based
economy.10 Recognizing the disadvantage of excessive reliance on crude
oil and natural gas, Qatar established Qatar National Vision 2030, a
program that aims to transform Qatar from a hydrocarbon-reliant economy
into a diversified, knowledge-based economy attractive to global
investors.11 Doing so would attract global financial institutions including
banks, insurance companies, and investment houses to conduct business in
Qatar, thereby fostering its goals of diversification away from a carbon-

8. See Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fundrankings/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015); Shai Bernstein et al., The Investment Strategies of Sovereign
Wealth Funds (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14861, 2009).
9. Qatari financial aspirations are already evident when examining the Qatari sovereign wealth
fund (“SWF”). The cash infusion from the export of energy products has enriched and empowered
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund which has been active in deploying its immense capital into a variety of
diversified investments. See Camilla Hall et al., Qatar: What’s Next for the World’s Most Aggressive
Deal Hunter, FIN. TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/dc99ef1e-de45-11e2-9b4700144feab7de.html#slide0. For further reading, see generally George Kratsas & Jon Truby, Regulating
Sovereign Wealth Funds to Avoid Investment Protectionism, 1 J. FIN. REG. 95 (2015); Joel Slawotsky,
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers, 40 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1239 (2009).
10. This is the overriding objective of the Qatar National Vision 2030. See generally GEN.
SECRETARIAT FOR DEV. & PLANNING, QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030 (2008), http://
www.mdps.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/qatar_national_vision/qnv_2030_document/QNV2030_E
nglish_v2.pdf [hereinafter QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030]. This can also be seen in the Qatar National
Development Strategy 2011-2016. See generally GEN. SECRETARIAT FOR DEV. & PLANNING, QATAR
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2011-2016 (2011), www.gsdp.gov.qa/www1_docs/NDS_EN.pdf.
Huge investments in education has been the hallmark of Qatari governmental policy in recent years.
See, e.g., Qatar Education City, TEN EDUC., http://education.theemiratesnetwork.com/zones/
qatar_education_city.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (noting that Qatar is home to campuses of leading
global academic institutions such as Georgetown, Weill-Cornell Medical College, Carnegie Mellon,
Northwestern and others). Qatar University has also experienced tremendous growth and a dramatic
increase in programming is expected in the near term. See Our History, QATAR UNIV.,
http://www.qu.edu.qa/theuniversity/history.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). In addition, Qatar is
pioneering research-based publishing with impressive forays into legal, medical, educational, through
Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation. See QSCIENCE.COM, http://www.qscience.com/ (last visited Nov. 9,
2015).
11. See generally QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030, supra note 10.
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based economy.12 Qatar thus aims to become not only a regional financial
hub, but an important world financial center.13
To realize this goal, Qatar must develop its equity markets14 so as to
encourage both domestic and international investment.15 Indeed,
recognizing the need to attract domestic capital and FDI, the National
Vision places special emphasis on encouraging vibrant equity markets to
“diversify the country’s economy[,] . . . guaranteeing a stable and
sustainable business environment, . . . helping increase competition,
attracting more investments, and stimulating growth.”16 The Qatari
government has recognized that “a strong financial sector is critical to
supporting the Government’s efforts to create jobs and encourage
investment in a diversified economy.”17 To advance these goals, Qatar has
encouraged trading on the Qatar Stock Exchange (“Qatar Exchange”) by
embracing better transparency and disclosure rules.18 The value of Qatar

12. The wisdom of diversifying Qatar’s economy has become self-evident with the plunge in
energy prices that occurred in 2014-2015. See Mark Shenk & Rebecca Penty, The Commodity
Currency Plunge Is Making the Oil Crash Even Worse, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-17/oil-bull-agony-prolonged-as-commoditycurrency-drop-extends-glut (noting a 60 percent plunge in prices from June 2014 to August 2015).
13. See Ibrahim & Harrigan, supra note 6, at 17 (“Despite difficult conditions in the global
financial economy, Qatar’s financial sector will continue to expand and support growth in the wider
economy. The Qatar Financial Centre Authority is actively promoting development of asset
management, captive insurance and re-insurance businesses.”).
14. Id. (“Qatar Exchange, the country’s stock exchange, is launching new trading platforms. A
‘junior bourse’ will soon open to provide better access to equity finance for smaller businesses.
Secondary trading of government paper and issuance of securities of longer maturity will support the
development of a domestic corporate debt market and sukuk (Islamic financial bonds). The commercial
banking sector, both conventional and Islamic, is expected to enjoy healthy growth in its retail business,
and will have the opportunity to participate in the funding of a substantive pipeline of capital
projects.”). For further reading see Karim Ginena & Jon Truby, Deutsche Bank and the Use of
Promises in Islamic Finance Contracts, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 619 (2013).
15. The Qatari Companies Law of 2002 prohibits non-Qataris from being shareholders in
shareholding companies. See Law No. 5 of 2002 (Commercial Companies Law), art. 67 [hereinafter
Commercial Companies Law]. However, this Article has been overruled by Law No. 13 of 2000
(Foreign Investment Law) [hereinafter Qatar Investment Law] regulating the investment of foreign
capital in economic activities which permits non-Qataris to own 25% (or more if the articles of
association permits) of shares in Qatar Exchange listed public shareholding companies. See Alex
Brightman, Issues to Consider When Doing Business in Qatar, K&L GATES LLP 4 (2014),
http://www.klconstructionlawblog.com/files/2014/10/Construction-group-lunchtime-presentationDoing.pdf.
16. Strategic Plan for Financial Sector Regulation, QATAR FIN. CTR. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.qfcra.com/en-us/publications/Strategic_Plan/index70e3.html?page=challenges-andopportunities (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Reminder: Daily Disclosure of Major Shareholders Who Own 5% or More of the
Listed Company’s Capital, QATAR STOCK EXCH. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/
qe+english+portal/Pages/Details/Display%20Information%20Details?InfoID=17670&ImgURL=undefi
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Exchange has grown impressively—the market capitalization in November
2015 was approximately $154 billion.19 The fact that Qatar has been
upgraded from “frontier market” to “emerging market” status illustrates the
tectonic shifts underway in the Gulf nation.20
However, to the end of achieving its goals, there is an additional
avenue Qatar should consider: reforming corporate governance. The
efficient governance of large companies is needed to ensure a properly
functioning economy and encourage the free movement of capital.
Numerous studies have documented the importance of corporate
governance for access to financing, cost of capital, valuation, and
performance using various methodologies. The research demonstrates that
better corporate governance leads to higher returns on equity and more
efficient capital markets. The law and finance literature underscores the
important role of institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement.
The research brings out the positive relationship between institutional
features and the development of financial markets, relative corporate sector
valuations, the efficiency of investment allocation, and economic growth
across countries.21 Conversely, a low level of corporate governance will
damage the ability to attract FDI and deter development of markets by
discouraging investors. 22
Not surprisingly, a low level of governance can cause significant longterm damage to national economic performance by enabling lackluster
management and poor overall economic performance. Japan’s “lost
decades” experience provides a compelling example of the urgent need to
examine and improve Qatari corporate governance. The Japanese economy,
once a paragon of strength, has been under-performing for almost twenty-

ned (requiring disclosure from owners of 5% or more of the shares of a publicly traded company). This
rule is similar to the United States disclosure rule 13(d) mandating disclosure from 5% owners. See
Securities Exchange Act of, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (necessitating a public disclosure upon
ownership of 5 percent of a public company’s shares).
19. See Qatar SE, ZAWYA, https://www.zawya.com/middle-east/financial-markets/qatar/ (last
visited Nov. 28, 2015) (noting the market capitalization of Qatar Exchange).
20. See Nikhil Lohade, Expectations Mixed as MSCI Reclassifies UAE, Qatar as Emerging
Markets, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2014/05/15/expectations-mixedas-msci-reclassifies-uae-qatar-as-emerging-markets/ (“Index compiler MSCI Inc. MSCI +0.34%
upgraded the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to emerging market status, from frontier, as part of its
semi-annual index review announcement late Wednesday – unlocking hundreds of millions of dollars in
potential global investments for the two Persian Gulf states.”).
21. Id.
22. Avinash Dixit, Governance, Development, and Foreign Direct Investment 1 (Max Weber
Programme Lecture No. 2012/01, 2012) (“[F]oreign firms have reason to be more fearful about the
protection of their property rights and contracts by host country governments and courts than do
domestic investors, who have better access to the political processes of the host country.”).
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five years.23 Though Japan once had the world’s second-largest economy
and threatened to overtake the United States’ lead, it has lagged behind
China since 2001.24 Even now, Japan’s economic performance continues to
decline—today, it is not substantially greater than India’s.25
Serious governance deficiencies weakened Japan’s economy,
contributing to its inability to attract sufficient capital.26 The Japanese
government has acknowledged poor governance as a proximate cause of
the country’s economic under-performance.27 Japan is now desperately
trying to improve its corporate governance by “implementing new
corporate governance and investor stewardship codes as part of Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s ‘third arrow’ of economic reforms to boost
growth. . . . The code is part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reforms to
boost Japan’s competitiveness, which include a new corporate governance
code set to take effect in June requiring companies to be more responsive to
shareholders.”28 For example, Japan has recently started a new code that
will call on firms to name two new independent directors.29

23. See Christopher Whalen, Is Japan’s Economy Headed for Collapse?, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept.
6, 2012), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/japans-economy-headed-collapse-11217 (“Japan was once
known as the land of the rising sun, but more recently it has become known as one of the worstmanaged economies in the world. The lost decade of the 1980s has extended into lost decades, with
subpar economic growth and a declining population among the list of accomplishments. Most
economists measure Japan’s malaise in the realm of public finance. Japan has the worst public balance
sheet in the world. The total public debt in Japan equals more than 200 percent of GDP. From 50
percent in 1980, the country’s total public debt as a percentage of GDP has quadrupled and will reach
227 percent by the end of next year, according to Japan’s Ministry of Finance.”).
24. Roland Gribben, China Overtakes Japan to Become World’s Second-Biggest Economy,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/7948638/China-overtakesJapan-to-become-worlds-second-biggest-economy.html.
25. See Joel Slawotsky, Sustainable Capitalism: Revelations From the Japanese Model, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 10, 17 (2012).
26. See Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Problems at Olympus a Sign of Investor Risk at Major
Japanese Companies, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/
2011/10/25/a-setting-sunrecent-scandal-at-olympus-a-sign-of-deeper-governance-issues-at-japanesecompanies/ (“Last year, Japan’s economy was eclipsed by China’s. The country’s corporate culture is
in in need of a serious overhaul.”).
27. See Andrea Wong & Isabel Reynolds, Abe Calls for More Governance Progress in Japan,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-29/abe-callsfor-more-corporate-governance-progress-in-japan (noting that Prime Minister Abe is calling for
dramatic corporate governance reform to lift Japan out of its economic malaise).
28. See Gregory Elders, Japan’s Corporate Governance Overhaul, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 10,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/japans-corporate-governance-overhaul/.
29. See Tom Redmond & Tatako Taniguchi, Herro Gives Japan Governance 2 Out of 10 Despite
Abe Efforts, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0526/herro-gives-japan-inc-2-10-for-governance-despite-abe-overhaul.
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Currently, Qatari governance is not highly ranked. Compared to its
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) peers,30 Qatar ranks poorly on a
number of governance metrics. With regard to overall ranking for corporate
governance, Qatar ranks behind Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and
Bahrain.31 Qatar also tends to score at the end of all three corporate
governance categories (transparency, accountability, and responsibility).32
Given Qatar’s goal of increasing business development within the
country and transforming itself into a financial hub, improved corporate
governance is vital. Because director conduct is a predominant component
of corporate governance, this Article focuses on director duties in
shareholding companies.33 Specifically, this Article examines the Qatari
director duty of care through the lens of Delaware law34 and provides
suggestions for improving Qatari corporate governance by developing the
law surrounding director duties.35 Part I discusses the current state of the

30. THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). The GCC members include: Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the U.A.E. GCC Member States, THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE
ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexc64c.html?action=GCC (last visited Nov.
9, 2015).
31. Nabil Baydoun et al., Corporate Governance in Five Arabian Gulf Countries 10 (paper
presented at the Sixth Asia Pac. Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference, Sydney,
Australia, July 11–13, 2010), http://apira2010.econ.usyd.edu.au/conference_proceedings/APIRA-2010281-Willet-Corporate-governance-in-five-Arabian-gulf-countries.pdf.
32. Id. at 11.
33. There are several business organizations in Qatar: joint company, limited partnership
company, particular partnership company, shareholding company, equities partnership company and
limited liability company. See Commercial Companies Law, supra note 15, art. 4. The Companies
Law sets out the various legal requirements and obligations of each type of business structure.
34. Delaware is the preeminent jurisdiction providing “global standards” for proper director
conduct. It is therefore uniquely qualified to base an analysis and provide suggestions for Qatari law
corporate governance. See Tom Hals, Delaware Court Upholds Perelman-M&F Ruling, May Alter
Buyouts, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/mfworldwidemacandrews-ruling-idUSL2N0MB1BP20140314 (noting that the Supreme Court of Delaware’s law
governs the majority of U.S. companies); Noam Noked, 2013 Delaware Decisions and What They
Mean for 2014, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/20/2013-delaware-decisions-and-what-they-mean-for2014/
(“Delaware has long been known as the corporate capital of the world. It is the state of incorporation for
64 percent of the Fortune 500 and more than half of all companies whose securities trade on the NYSE,
Nasdaq and other exchanges. Its preeminence in business law started with its corporate code—the
Delaware General Corporation Law—and has been enhanced by business law innovations that have led
to the creation of many new business entities designed to meet the expanding needs of corporate and
financial America.”); Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1523 (2007)
(“Delaware’s standards were important because of the number of large public firms incorporated there
and because of Delaware’s leadership role in the fashioning of fiduciary duty law.”).
35. The focus of this Article is on shareholder companies since these entities represent the major
business enterprises in Qatar and comprise the major businesses listed for trading on Qatar Exchange.
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Qatari economy before providing an overview of corporate governance.
Part II reviews the basic differences between governance systems. Part III
details Qatari law on director fiduciary obligations. A review of Delaware
law on director duties—focusing specifically on the director’s duty of
care—is discussed in Part IV. Part V contains suggestions for improving
the current Qatari law with respect to the director duty of care.
I. QATAR’S CURRENT FINANCIAL SUCCESS AND FUTURE
AMBITIONS
For almost ten years Qatar has generated around a third of all liquefied
natural gas (“LNG”), making it the world’s largest producer.36 Japan, for
example, buys virtually all of its gas and oil products from Qatar.37 Qatar is
also a major supplier to South Korea, Singapore, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany.38 The largest single LNG producer
is Qatargas,39 a Qatari company.40 Qatargas has been the world’s leading
LNG exporter since 2006.41 Qatar is also at the forefront of gas-to-liquids
(“GTL”) production, and the country is home to the world’s largest GTL
facility.42 More than half of Qatar’s GDP is generated by the oil and natural
gas industry.43
Qatar’s GDP of $211 billion is distributed amongst a small population
of just over two million residents, only approximately 400,000 of whom are
nationals. Not surprisingly, Qatar has the world’s highest per capita GDP at
over $93,000.44 This wealth is concentrated among Qatari nationals.
Salaries and state benefits for Qatari nationals are generous, while there is a
36. Qatar, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/
analysis_includes/countries_long/Qatar/qatar.pdf [hereinafter US EIA].
37. UK Warned Over Dependence on Qatar Gas, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/c403bec6-3f63-11e1-ad6a-00144feab49a.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz3jLT9Metl.
38. QATAR STAT. AUTH., QATAR ECONOMICS STATISTICS AT A GLANCE 12 (2012), https://
www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/25616022/qatar-economic-statistics-at-a-glance-qatar-statisticsauthority-.
39. About Us, QATARGAS, https://www.qatargas.com/English/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 9, 2015).
40. Id. (“Qatargas, established in 1984, pioneered the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Industry in
Qatar. Today, Qatargas is the largest LNG producing company in the world, with an annual LNG
production capacity of 42 million tonnes per annum (MTA).”).
41. US EIA, supra note 36, at 1.
42. The World’s Largest Gas-to-Liquids Plant is Now Fully Online, SHELL GLOBAL,
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/major-projects-2/pearl/largest-gtl-plant.html (last visited Nov.
28, 2015).
43. Qatar Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXP. COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/about_us/168.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
44. Data: Qatar, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar (last visited Nov. 28,
2015).
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ninety-eight percent pay gap between nationals and non-nationals.45
However, income distribution is uneven even among nationals with the
wealthiest nationals receiving thirteen times the income of the poorest.46
Utilizing its tremendous wealth, the Qatari Government has made
large investments in the last few decades in infrastructure projects,
research, and other non-energy dependent areas,47 with the goal of building
a sustainable and self-reliant economy on the foundation of a skilled
workforce.48 Education has become a priority— indeed, over four percent
of GDP has been spent on education annually since 2013.49 The following
section details the economic boom enjoyed by Qatar. The section also
describes Qatar’s plans for constructing a diversified knowledge-based
economy.
A. An Energy-Based Economic Boom
Economic statistics illustrate a fast-growing Qatari economy,50 highly
ranked in terms of growth rates, GDP, per capita GDP, and other
benchmarks.51 Indeed, Qatar’s per capita GDP exceeds $100,000 at
Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates52 and has been consistently ranked
45. Andy Sambridge, 98% Gap in Pay of Qatari Nationals, Expats – Survey, ARABIAN BUS.
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/98-gap-in-pay-of-qatari-nationals-expats-survey422930.html.
46. Income Equality, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18587127.
47. One of its budgetary aims is to be able to fully finance the budget from non-hydrocarbon
revenues by 2020. IMF, Qatar: Selected Issues, Country Report (Jan. 2012), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1219.pdf. See also Jon Truby, Fiscal Tools for Inclusion of GCC States in
the Global Environmental Programme: Focus Upon New Vehicle Imports, in GREEN TAXATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 144 (Larry Kreiser et al. eds., 2012). For further information on its
priorities in research, see QATAR NAT’L RESEARCH FUND, QATAR NATIONAL RESEARCH STRATEGY
(2012), http://qfrd.org/QNRS_2012/QNRS_2012.pdf.
48. See QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030, supra note 10.
49. Qatar Spent $6bn on Education, GULF TIMES, (Jan. 27, 2013) http://www.gulf-times.com/
qatar/178/details/339950/qatar-spent-$6bn-on-education.
50. See Qatar, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS [PWC], http://www.pwc.com/m1/en/about-us/
qatar.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (“Qatar has enjoyed significant economic growth with real GDP
increasing by 10.7% per annum since 2008.”).
51. See Ibrahim & Harrigan, supra note 6, at 1, 11 (“From 2000 and 2011, Qatar’s real GDP
expanded at an annual average rate of 13.1%. Much of this expansion occurred from 2004 to 2011,
when GDP growth averaged 15.9% a year. Globally, Qatar’s economic growth has been without
parallel, outstripping even that of China. When expressed in units of purchasing power, GDP per capita
in Qatar in 2010 ranked first globally among 182 countries. . . . Other yardsticks of economic
performance are equally impressive. Qatar has consistently posted large fiscal and current account
surpluses, often exceeding 10% of GDP. Its total saving has averaged 56% of GDP and investment
around 33% over the same period. In recent years, Qatar has been investing 10% of GDP on economic
and social infrastructure.”).
52. STEPHEN ANDERSON, PWC, QATAR ECONOMY WATCH 1 (2015), http://www.pwc.co.uk/
assets/pdf/qatar-economy-watch-january2015.pdf.
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number one for several years.53 Current Qatari GDP stands at approximately $200 billion with an annual growth rate of over five percent.54
In a recent global study of per capita net worth millionaires Qatar
ranked number one; a stunning seventeen percent of the population enjoyed
a net worth in excess of $1,000,000.55 This is thanks, in part, to strong
stock and equity performances, high government expenditures benefitting
local businesses, high spending on nationals’ salaries and benefits, a light
tax regime, and regulations guaranteeing nationals ownership rights in
national businesses and land.56 The exploitation of vast hydrocarbon wealth
has also contributed to Qatar’s economic boom.57 Proven oil reserves in
excess of twenty-five billion barrels should enable continued output at
current levels for about fifty-seven years.58 Qatar’s proven reserves of
natural gas exceed twenty-five trillion cubic meters, about thirteen percent
of the world total.59
The growth in Qatar’s natural gas production, particularly since 2000,
has also increased Qatar’s total liquids production because lease condensates, natural gas plant liquids, and other petroleum liquids are a
significant (and valuable) byproduct of natural gas production.60 As discussed above, the successful exportation of LNG and other energy products
has produced a tremendous windfall for the nation.61 However, as described
in the next section, Qatar has begun the long process of diversifying its
economy.

53. Data: GDP Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), WORLD BANK, http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
54. The World Factbook: Qatar, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact
book/geos/qa.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Qatar Factbook].
55. See THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., GLOBAL WEALTH 2014: RIDING A WAVE OF GROWTH 7
(2014), http://www.bcg.com.cn/export/sites/default/en/files/publications/reports_pdf/ BCG_Riding_a_
Wave_of_Growth_Jun_2014.pdf (ranking Qatar in first place; other highly ranked nations include:
Switzerland (#2); Kuwait (#5); Israel (#8); Saudi Arabia (#13) and Canada (#15)).
56. See CLYDE & CO, DOING BUSINESS IN QATAR: AN OVERVIEW 1, 3, http://www.qbbf.com/
downloads/Doing%20Business%20in%20Qatar%20%28LR%29.pdf (stating that Qatari nationals must
own 51% of companies registered under Qatari law, and foreigners cannot buy land in most parts of the
country).
57. OPEC, ANNUAL STATISTICAL BULLETIN 17 (2015), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_
files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pd.
58. See Qatar Factbook, supra note 54.
59. Id.
60. International Energy Data and Analysis: Qatar, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=QA (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
61. Qatar frequently reports a high budget surplus, even during a time of low energy prices.
Budget Surplus at Over QR100bn in Jan 2015, PENINSULA (Mar. 11, 2015), http://thepeninsula
qatar.com/business/qatar-business/326289/budget-surplus-at-over-qr100bn-in-jan-2015.
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B. Qatari Ambitions: Diversification Into Finance
Qatar is an emirate whose hereditary leadership works with an
appointed council empowered by its Constitution to vote on legislative
matters.62 The Permanent Constitution protects various freedoms and
organizes both the legislative and judicial systems.63 The Government owns
the national energy company Qatar Petroleum which, either directly or
through its subsidiaries, enters into profit sharing agreements with
international energy companies to exploit Qatari hydrocarbon reserves.64
The country’s stability and high peace rating65 have attracted foreign
investors. Qatari corporate law seeks to encourage FDI while promoting the
interests of nationals because nationals must own a minimum of fifty-one
percent of all companies that are not registered in the Qatar Financial
Centre.66
Qatar’s leadership has determined that over-reliance on energy exports
is not in the country’s long-term interest and has, therefore, planned to
develop a sustainable, diversified economy underpinned by a skilled,
educated workforce.67 This transformative process is underway, and one of
its central tenets is that the wealth generated by energy exports be used to
develop non-energy sectors, thereby diversifying the economy.68 Qatar’s
national goals include establishing:
[a] stimulating business climate capable of attracting foreign funds and
technologies and of encouraging national investments. . . . A knowledgebased economy characterized by innovation; entrepreneurship;
excellence in education; a world-class infrastructural backbone; the
efficient delivery of public services; and transparent and accountable
government.69

62. PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF QATAR Aug. 30, 2004, art. 61.
63. The Constitution, HUKOOMI: QATAR E-GOVERNMENT, http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/
(follow “The Constitution” under “About Qatar” category) (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
64. QATAR PETROLEUM, https://www.qp.com.qa/en/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Nov. 28,
2015).
65. See 2015 Global Peace Index, VISION OF HUMANITY, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/
page/indexes/global-peace-index (finding that Qatar ranks as the most peaceful country in the region)
(last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
66. QATAR FIN. CTR., www.qfc.qa (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
67. See QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030, supra note 10 (“A diversified economy that gradually
reduces its dependence on hydrocarbon industries, enhances the role of the private sector. . . .”).
68. See STEPHEN ANDERSON, PwC, QATAR ECONOMY WATCH 2 (2015), http://www.pwc.co.uk/
assets/pdf/qatar-economy-watch-january2015.pdf (finding that from 2008 through 2013, Qatar’s
government revenue from non-hydrocarbon sources increased by 12% per annum).
69. Id.
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Consistent with this approach, Qatar National Vision 2030 recognizes
that the country’s progress can no longer rest on the exploitation of its
natural resources.70 Instead, Qatar’s National Vision 2030 articulates the
Qatari government’s plan to transform Qatar’s economy into one that is
global and knowledge-based by establishing advanced educational and
health systems. Further the Qatari government has directed the investment
of substantial resources in such systems.71 Educational facilities such as
Education City are host to leading global academic institutions in order to
achieve the Qatar National Vision 2030.72 In furtherance of the 2030
Vision, the state-sponsored Qatar University has significantly expanded
and is graduating a growing cadre of leaders in areas including energy, arts,
sciences, business, economics, law and engineering.73 Qatar is also a
pioneer in publishing research journals in medicine, law, education and
business.74
Vibrant capital markets, which are crucial for a healthy economy, are
a cornerstone of Qatar’s ambitions. Indeed, developing the Qatari financial
sector is regarded as critical to achieving the ambitious National Vision.
The financial sector not only guides economic resources towards projects
with high economic and social return, but also provides the funding needed
for sustainable economic development through either the Qatari banking
system or the Qatari capital market.75Accordingly, Qatar has modernized
its national stock market, Qatar Exchange.76 The Qatar Exchange—
representing the largest private sector businesses in Qatar—had a market

70. QATAR NATIONAL VISION 2030, supra note 10.
71. MINISTRY OF INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. QATAR, TRANSFORMING THE STATE OF QATAR
TOWARD A KNOWLEDGE BASE ECONOMY 1, http://www.mdps.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/
media_center/news_listing/manage_missilanous_files/ictQATAR.pdf.
72. See Alan Weber, Linking Education to Creating a Knowledge Society: Qatar’s Investment in
the Education Sector, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE MENA REGION:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 52 (Neeta Baporikar ed., 2014).
73. See JOY S. MOINI ET AL., RAND-QATAR POL’Y INST., THE REFORM OF QATAR UNIVERSITY,
at xiii (2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG796.pdf.
74. Qatar Foundation’s journals publish peer-reviewed research articles. See QSCIENCE.COM,
http://www.qscience.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (“QScience.com is [an] innovative and
collaborative, peer-reviewed, online publishing platform . . . .”); Jon M. Truby, Foreword From the
Editor-in-Chief, INT’L REV. L., Apr. 27, 2012, at 1, 1 (discussing the peer-reviewing processes that the
journal uses to evaluate submissions).
75. Chairman’s Message, QATAR FIN. MKTS. AUTH. [QFMA], http://www.qfma.org.qa/English/
CeoMessage.aspx?id=40 (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
76. See, e.g., Reminder: Daily Disclosure of Major Shareholders Who Own, 5% or More of the
Listed Company’s Capital, QATAR STOCK EXCH. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/
qe+english+portal/Pages/Details/Display%20Information%20Details/?InfoID=17670&ImgURL= (discussing the planned implementation of a rule requiring disclosure of shareholders who own more than
5% of the company’s listed capital).
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capitalization of approximately $155 billion as of late November 2015.77
The companies listed for trading represented a wide array of leading
business enterprises including: construction, financial services, insurance
and industrial.78 To promote stock market growth and increase liquidity,
Qatar has embraced a relatively progressive approach to opening up its
financial markets.79 For example, Qatar has enacted laws allowing foreign
investors80 and foreign legal persons to hold an increasingly higher
percentage of shares.81 The expansion of the potential shareholder base
allows foreigners to own up to forty-nine percent of a listed company in
contrast with the former limit of twenty-five percent.82 The Qatar Financial
Centre Authority was established to promote the development of the
financial services industry.83 The fact that Qatar was the first Gulf nation

77. See QATAR STOCK EXCH., https://www.zawya.com/middle-east/financial-markets/qatar/ (last
visited Nov. 28, 2015) (displaying market capitalization of Qatar Exchange).
78. See QATAR STOCK EXCH., OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGES FOR LISTED COMPANIES (2016),
http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/qe+english+portal/Pages/Market+Statistics/Statistical+Reports
(listing
companies by business sector).
79. See, e.g., infra note 81 (noting the percentage of permissible non-Qatari ownership potential
was raised from 25% to 49%).
80. “Foreign investors” are defined as “Non-Qatari nationals, Natural or Juridical.” Qatar
Investment Law, supra note 15, art. 1.
81. Qatar Exchange has encouraged foreign ownership. See Robert Tuttle, Qatar Ups ‘Efforts’ to
Raise Foreign Caps Before MSCI Decision, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 5, 2013), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2013-06-05/qatar-ups-efforts-to-raise-foreign-caps-before-msci-decision.html (“Qatar
said it’s making ‘extensive efforts’ to raise foreign ownership limits of companies on its bourse, a week
before MSCI Inc. decides whether to upgrade the nation to emerging market status.”). In 2014, Qatar
exchange raised foreign ownership limits from 25% to 49%. Hadeel al Sayegh, Qatar Lifts Foreign
Ownership Limits on Shares Ahead of MSCI Upgrade, NATIONAL (May 27, 2014), http://www.the
national.ae/business/industry-insights/markets/qatar-lifts-foreign-ownership-limits-on-shares-ahead-ofmsci-upgrade.
82. 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Qatar, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 2014)
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/230858.htm. Moreover, “[f]oreign investors are generally
not allowed to participate in initial public offerings (IPO), though exceptions are occasionally made on
a case-by-case basis (primarily for other GCC nationals).” Id. This exclusion, applicable to nonQataris, will prevent the expansion of the shareholder base to its full potential. Moreover, treating nonQatari GCC nationals as Qataris is potentially problematic. The treatment of GCC nationals essentially
makes these investors “Qatari” and thus exempt from the 49% restriction as well as vests these
investors with the ability to participate in IPOs. Inasmuch as Qatar has signed BITs with non-GCC
members which generally contain most favored nation status clauses as well as anti-discrimination
obligations, such treatment may violate an international investment treaty. See, e.g., Agreement
Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Government of the State of Qatar on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 4, Nov. 6, 2007, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/404 (prohibiting each contracting state from giving better
treatment to citizens of a third state). Thus, the rule allowing non-Qatari GCC nationals to be treated
more favorably may implicate Qatar’s international investment treaty obligations.
83. See Partner Profiles: Qatar Financial Centre Authority, DOING BUS. IN QATAR, http://
www.qatar.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/partner-profiles/qfca/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (noting that
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with Chinese yuan clearing abilities is a testimony to the expansion of its
financial sector.84
If Qatar is to succeed in becoming a major center of finance, banking,
and investment, a stable and reliable legal system is essential. Qatar cannot
become a successful financial center unless investors have confidence that
Qatari companies will act to maximize profits. A high level of corporate
governance is linked to healthy capital markets, an ability to attract and
retain FDI, and generally superior economic performance.85 Accordingly,
an important part of Qatar’s vision is the attraction of international
investors to Qatari capital markets by “enhancing the regulatory entities
and increasing the coordination and cooperation among them in order to
create an integrated regulatory and supervisory model that helps to enhance
competition and attract more local and foreign investments.”86
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Good corporate governance of publicly traded entities is a pillar of
modern economies, having taken on increased significance in light of
globalization and recent economic crises. Corporate governance is a broad
topic covering numerous aspects of how companies operate including the
role and composition of the board of directors, special committees,
monitoring management, independent directors, transparency and disclosure requirements, control mechanisms, minority shareholder rights, the
role of non-shareholder stakeholders, and other relevant areas. According
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment
(“OECD”) corporate governance:
involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that
are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should
facilitate effective monitoring.87

QFCA is actively involved in promoting development of asset management, captive insurance and reinsurance businesses).
84. Qatar to Become First Middle East Clearing Hub for China’s Yuan, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/04/china-offshore-yuan-idUSL4N0SU3KV20141104.
85. RONALD J. GIBSON, TRANSPARENCY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 12
(2000), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1921785.pdf.
86. Chairman’s Message, supra note 75.
87. OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (1999).
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Corporate governance is a lynchpin of superior economic performance, and a high level of governance delivers better company performance and shareholder-value.88 Directors lead a company, and accordingly,
director conduct and liability forms a substantial part of corporate
governance.
A. Corporate Governance Model: Shareholder Primacy or Stakeholder
Whether the corporate governance system is focused primarily on
shareholder-value or stakeholder interests substantially impacts the
fiduciary obligations of directors. In a shareholder profits-centric jurisdiction, the director’s duties are primarily owed to the company and its
shareholders. In contrast, in a stakeholder system, directors are obligated to
consider (or, at least, have discretion to take into account) the interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders. These other stakeholders include,
among others, the community, society, employees, suppliers, ethics, and
the environment. The following sub-sections discuss these competing
models.89
1. Shareholder-Centric
In the United States, corporate governance is concerned with the
fiduciary relationship between management (directors, officers, and senior
managers) and the shareholders primarily (though not exclusively) in the
context of conflicts of interest.90 The divergent interests of management
and the shareholders tend to manifest themselves in three—sometimes
overlapping—management agency conflicts. First, managers may be
involved in shirking conflicts, concentrating on activities that will enrich
management personally rather than spending time on corporate profits.91
88. See STIJN CLAESSENS & BURCIN YUTOGLU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT—AN UPDATE 20 (2012), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/518e9e804a70d9ed942
ad6e6e3180238/Focus10_CG%26Development.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (“Better corporate governance
can also add value by improving firm performance through more efficieint management, better asset
allocation, better labor policies, and other efficiency improvements.”); see also MARIA MAHER ET AL.,
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 31
(1999), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/2090569.pdf (citing empirical evidence that corporate governance
correlates positively for industrial competitiveness of OECD countries).
89. For a fuller discussion of the shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance
see Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global Collaboration and Financial Innovation,
35 REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCE LAW (forthcoming 2016).
90. The United States and other nations that have a dispersed shareholder base are primarily
entangled with management agency conflicts.
91. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L REV. 1461,
1471 (1989) (“All agents have a potential interest in working at a slack pace and in avoiding the effort
and discomfort involved in adapting to changed circumstances, such as the emergence of new
technologies.”).
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Second, managers may take part in looting conflicts, procuring for
themselves salaries and benefits not commensurate with their work or the
financial success of the company.92 Third, and finally, managers may
engage in positional conflicts by seeking to entrench themselves by
ensuring that they cannot easily be replaced.93 Notably, these conflicts are
enumerated in the introduction to the Qatar Exchange Code.94
The case of Simon-World-Wide, a publicly traded company in the
United States, illustrates these conflicts. A major shareholder alleged that
the directors and officers were engaged in all three conflicts vis-à-vis the
company and its shareholders. In a regulatory filing, the majority shareholder sent a letter to the company’s directors outlining the conflicts of
interest between the company’s managers and directors and the
shareholders.95 The letter alleged that the directors (1) had failed to hold a
shareholders’ meeting for four years (positional conflicts), (2) were being
paid exorbitant salaries in light of the business’s failure to earn any income
(looting conflicts), and (3) were not in fact working at their offices
(shirking conflicts).96
United States corporate governance is focused on addressing and
deterring these conflicts. Lawsuits are frequently filed in American courts
alleging that a company’s managers were engaged in one or more of these
conflicts of interest, which clash with the shareholder-value mantra of
United States corporate governance.97 Delaware courts have adopted

92. Id. (“All agents have a potential interest in diverting the principal’s assets to their own
use . . . .”).
93. Id. at 1471–72 (“[T]op corporate managers have the power to give expression to still a third
potential divergence of interest: an interest in maintaining and enhancing their positions even at the
shareholders’ expense.”).
94. QFMA, TRANSLATION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR COMPANIES LISTED IN
MARKETS REGULATED BY THE QATAR FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY 5 (2009) [hereinafter QFMA
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE].
95. Information to be Included in Statements Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d-1(a) and Amendments
Thereto Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d-2(a), SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 11–12 (May 11, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864264/000092189506001187/0000921895-06-001187.txt.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
The claims were the executive engaged in: shirking conflicts, id. at 283, looting conflicts (continuing to
obtain a large salary while shirking) and positional conflicts, id. at 284. While the defendant executives
ultimately prevailed, the examples of divergent interests remain viable exemplars of potential conflicts.
See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also Emon Reiser,
Office Depot-Staples Deal ‘Fraught With Conflict of Interest,’ Complaint Alleges, SOUTH FLA. BUS. J.
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2015/04/06/office-depot-staples-dealfraught-with-conflict-of.html (“Office Depot executives may not have negotiated the best sale price for
the company . . . .”); Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (adjudicating allegations
of directors engaging in conflicts of interest with shareholders).
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standards, discussed below, for evaluating alleged conflicts of interest
between management and shareholders.98
Pursuant to the shareholder-value approach, shareholders—as owners
of the business—are entitled to have the business run solely for their
benefit.99 Accordingly, the directors are obligated to conduct the
company’s affairs with the objective of maximizing the shareholder’s
profits.100 The rationale is that the shareholders are not only owners, but
also risk-bearers. Because shareholders risked their capital and created a
firm and employment opportunities,101 the argument goes, they deserve to
reap the rewards of their efforts. This theme is central to judicial opinions
in the United States that take the shareholder-value approach to evaluating
director conduct. Thus, under Delaware law, it is the responsibility of the
directors to maximize shareholder-value as opposed to looking out for the
interests of other stakeholders.102
The United States is historically not alone in its shareholder-value
focus. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada were also traditionally
considered shareholder-value countries. However, in recent years, the trend
in these other historically shareholder-centric nations has been to mitigate
the focus on profits in what has been referred to as “enlightened
shareholder value.” Even some American political103 and business leaders

98. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under
Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 393 (2014) (“Delaware is the state where the majority of the
largest U.S. companies are incorporated, and its corporate law often serves as the authority that other
U.S. states and countries look to when developing their own statutory and case law.”) (footnotes
omitted).
99. See e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“Although such
considerations [of non-stockholder corporate constituencies and interests] may be permissible, there are
fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”).
100. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (recognizing “the
basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation’s stockholders”); Paramount Commc’ns v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (same).
101. See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 2012, at 49, 49 (“Without shareholders who are willing to take risks that a bank or a bondholder
would not, these companies might remain stuck in low gear or never even get moving. The investors
who provide this cash are usually granted clout commensurate with their contribution.”).
102. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price
available); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345–46 (Del. 1987)
(upholding directors’ defensive measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill
agreement to thwart activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer).
103. See Joel Slawotsky, Sustainable Capitalism: Revelations from the Japanese Model, 63
HASTINGS L.J. VOIR DIRE 10, 10 (2012) (“Critics of America’s shareholder-centric model allege that it
is archaic and a failure, and they believe that the American version of capitalism must undergo a
dramatic shift toward a stakeholder-based model emulating other nations . . . . President Obama recently
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have begun to advocate this model.104 The United Kingdom has led the
“enlightened shareholder” trend.105 Pursuant to this model, “corporations
should pursue shareholder wealth with a long-run orientation that seeks
sustainable growth and profits based on responsible attention to the full
range of relevant stakeholder interests.”106 This approach is codified in the
United Kingdom by the landmark Companies Act 2006, which represents a
key shift away from the shareholder-value model towards a stakeholder
model.107
Pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, directors are to manage the
company in the “best interests” of the business.108 The phrase “best
interests” arguably gestures toward a middle ground between the pure
shareholder and stakeholder models.109 This middle ground is also referred
to as “sustainable capitalism.”110 The fiduciary obligations of UK directors
were thus broadened to encompass interests other than shareholders. UK
directors are now obligated to act to promote the “success of the company,”

echoed the ‘sustainable capitalism’ theme by calling for major changes that would enhance the interests
of other stakeholders in order to construct an economy ‘built to last.’”).
104. See James Surowiecki, A Fair Day’s Wage, NEW YORKER (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2015/02/09/fair-days-wage (quoting AETNA’s CEO Mark Bertolini as stating
that “[c]ompanies are not just money-making machines” and that with respect to pay raises, “[f]or the
good of the social order, these are the kinds of investments we [corporations] should be willing to
make.”).
105. Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L.
REV. 329, 340 (2006).
106. David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility and the Redefinition of
Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 68, 68
(P.M. Vasudev et al. eds., 2012).
107. Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose in a
Post-Financial Crisis World?, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 50, 53 (Joan Laughrey ed., 2013); see generally Ruth V. Aguilera et al.,
Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and the US, 14
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 147 (comparing the U.K. corporate governance system to the U.S.
system)
108. See John Lowry, Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act
2006, INT’L REV. L. Apr. 30, 2012, at 1, 9 n.63.
109. See Cynthia A. Williams et al., An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 493, 500 (2005) (“[A] British corporate
governance system that embodies a concept of enlightened shareholder value may be emerging to
occupy a unique third position between the American shareholder wealth-maximizing position and the
continental stakeholder model.”).
110. See, e.g., Al Gore et al., A Manifesto for Sustainable Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011,
at A21 (“Before the crisis and since, we and others have called for a more responsible form of
capitalism, what we call sustainable capitalism: a framework that seeks to maximize long-term
economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while integrating environmental, social and
governance (ESG) metrics throughout the decision-making process.”).
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which envisions taking into account a varied list of stakeholders including:
employees, suppliers, customers, environmental concerns, the community
and reputational business conduct.111
UK law clearly imposes upon directors a heightened need to consider
these “other interests” in the boardroom. Court rulings in the United
Kingdom have made clear that directors who fail to account for other
stakeholders when making business decisions expose themselves to civil
liability.112 One court stated, “the directors are under a fiduciary duty to the
company to have regard to, inter alia, the interests of members and
employees.”113 The stakeholder model has also made significant advances
in traditionally shareholder-value nations such as Canada.114
2. Stakeholder Model
The stakeholder-value model is popular in the European Union and
Japan, and is growing globally.115 Under this model, the company is

111. Companies Act 2006 c. 46 § 172 (UK).
112. See Lowry, supra note 108, at 10 (discussing a U.K. case in which a director of a corporation
was found liable for not acting in the best interest of “claimants” in the company).
113. Dawson Int’l Plc v. Coats Paton Plc [1989] BCLC 233, 240.
114. In BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, ¶ 81, the Canadian Supreme
Court ruled that directors must balance various stakeholder interests “in accordance with their fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.” (emphasis
added). The court in fact stated: “In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.” Id. ¶ 40. See also Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee
of) v. Wise. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, ¶ 42 (“We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining
whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate,
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests
of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”).
115. See Slawotsky, supra note 25, at 11 (noting “the stakeholder model—which elevates the
interests of stakeholders over shareholder profits—as practiced in many EU nations and Japan”);
Corrine M. Fiesel, Fiduciary Duties of Directors, Corporate Governance and the End of Shareholder
Primacy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 61, 78
(Poonam Puri & Jeffrey Larsen eds., 2004) (“Over 30 U.S. states now have legislation permitting
corporate directors to consider interests of other groups, in addition to shareholders, in their decisionmaking.”). However, the profits-centric approach is also making inroads into historically stakeholdercentric jurisdictions e.g., Inger Marie Hagen, Employee-Elected Directors on Company Boards:
Stakeholder Representatives or the Voice of Labor?, in RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM
SHAREHOLDER VALUE TO STAKEHOLDER VALUE 121, 123 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2011) (“One of the
major questions (at least before the financial crisis) was whether the European model of Corporate
Governance would convert into the Anglo-American shareholder-based model, or rather, how long this
would take.”). Norway serves as an example of this of this transition: It has traditionally been viewed
as one of the representatives of the European stakeholder model. Id. at 121. However, Norway’s state
owned SWF is shifting its traditional corporate social responsibility based activism towards a
broadening scope of activism to include shareholder-value. The Norwegian SWF is therefore moving
towards a profits-centric shareholder value activism. See Ruth Sullivan, Norwegian Wealth Fund Set to
Raise Bar on Governance, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea0ede56-0fc9-

2. SLAWOTSKY TRUBY(DO NOT DELETE)

2016

THE DIRECTOR DUTY OF CARE IN QATAR

6/9/2016 4:03 PM

357

considered a nexus of “unwritten” contracts between various constituencies
with an interest in the business. These contracts determine the various
stakeholders’ rights and obligations.116 In terms of corporate governance
and company law, directors must make decisions taking into account the
interests of these various “constituents” who effectively have “rights” in
the company. The stakeholders include creditors, employees, suppliers,
customers, and the society at large.
Under a stakeholder-value model, maximizing profits or shareholders
returns are not the only goals of a business. Instead, other interests play a
role in corporate decision making, including the interests of employees,
consumers, suppliers, the environment, the local community, and the wider
global audience. Under the stakeholder theory, director conduct that
considers non-shareholders may not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty
because directors are permitted to take into account and possibly favor nonshareholders. Therefore, the stakeholder model alters the liability landscape
in comparison to the shareholder-value model. For example, in Delaware,
directors owe Revlon duties once the sale of a corporation has been
decided.117 Revlon duties mandate that the directors obtain the best price
possible, notwithstanding other considerations.118
However, in a stakeholder jurisdiction, directors in a sale situation
may consider the impact of the transaction on other constituencies. For
example, if a proposed transaction will result in mass layoffs, directors in
stakeholder nations may be empowered to block the transaction. These
directors could exercise their business judgment and accept a lower offer if
the lower offer will not eliminate jobs. Similarly, directors could block a
transaction that would result in environmental degradation or adversely

11e3-99e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zs3qenxh; see also Investor Muscle, FIN. TIMES (Aug 8, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8eeb7524-002f-11e3-9c40-00144feab7de.html#axzz2zs3qenxh. For a
fuller discussion of SWFs and activism, see generally, Joel Slawotsky, Incipient Activism of Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Impact on U.S. Securities Laws, 2015 QATAR UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
LAW (2015), http://www.qscience.com/doi/pdf/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.8.
116. Xin Denga et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization:
Evidence from Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87, 88 (2013).
117. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“The Revlon board’s
authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a
recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit . . . . The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”).
118. See id. at 185 (“[W]e must conclude that under all the circumstances the directors allowed
considerations other than the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and followed
a course that ended the auction for Revlon, absent court intervention, to the ultimate detriment of its
shareholders.”).
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affect the interests of customers, suppliers, or other stakeholders under the
banner of enlightened shareholder-value. The potential permutations
represent a daunting challenge in balancing stakeholder interests.
Ultimately, the stakeholder model is distinguishable from the shareholdervalue where, for example, directors are obligated by Revlon to achieve the
maximum price for shareholders regardless of other considerations.
B. Qatari Corporate Governance
A crucial question is whether Qatar is a shareholder-value jurisdiction
or a stakeholder jurisdiction. Depending upon the model, certain conduct
may or may not be “mistaken,” “negligent,” or otherwise violate a
director’s fiduciary duties.
1. Is Qatar Shareholder or Stakeholder?
Qatar’s model of corporate governance is more closely aligned to a
shareholder value model although other stakeholders are ostensibly
considered. The preamble of the Qatar Exchange Code (“the Code”) cites
to OECD best practices on corporate governance, which state that
governance encompasses the rights and obligations of the various
participants in a business including shareholders and “other
stakeholders.”119 The Code states, “The corporate governance structure
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different
participants in the corporation, such as, the Board, managers, shareholders
and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making
decisions on corporate affairs.”120 The Code defines stakeholders as,
“[e]very person (legal or natural) having an interest in the Company
including for example shareholders, employees, creditors, clients,
customers, suppliers and investors.”121
However, the Code references “other stakeholders” in only two
sections other than the definitions section. The first discusses
communication with other stakeholders but does not articulate or
recommend any specific director obligations to these “other stake-

119. QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, at 4.
120. Id. This description is nearly identical to—and is clearly based upon—the OECD definition.
“The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the
different participants in the organisation—such as the board, managers, shareholders and other
stakeholders—and lays out the rules and procedures for decision-making.” OECD GLOSSARY OF
STATISTICAL TERMS, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6778 (last visited February 12,
2016).
121. QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, at 12.
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holders.”122 Moreover, the reference only lists shareholders, managers, and
employees as “other stakeholders” and does not mention any other
constituencies.123 The second reference states, “The rights of Stakeholders
are to be respected.”124 This reference, also, lists only shareholders,
managers and employees as stakeholders, leaving out other potential
stakeholders.125 Moreover, the recommendation to respect managers and
employees as stakeholders is linked to overall shareholder-value. The
consideration of managers and employees is limited to merit-based
compensation and does not include whether employees should be
terminated.126 The Code states that each company should have a
compensation system that rewards good performance of other stakeholders,
managers and employees to enhance company value. 127 The only apparent
“other stakeholders” referenced as parties “having rights” presumably
sufficient that directors can take their interests into the boardroom are
“employees and management.” Non-company stakeholders such as
customers, suppliers, and the local community or environment are not
included.128 Thus, the reference to “respecting other stakeholders” does not
translate into a stakeholder model of governance.
It is also noteworthy that the potential conflicts of interest listed by the
Code are the management agency conflicts between directors and
shareholders commonly found in the United States shareholder-centric
system.129 This also militates towards finding Qatar a shareholder-value
jurisdiction. This conclusion is re-enforced by the fact that Qatar’s
Companies Law makes no reference to stakeholders. Unlike the UK’s
Companies Act, there are no articulated constituents that directors can or
must take into account. Qatar’s governance model is thus more closely
aligned with the United States shareholder-value model.

122. Id. art. 12.1 (“[T]he Board Secretary shall also be in charge of ensuring timely access to
information and coordination among the Board Members as well as between the Board and the other
stakeholders in the company including shareholders, management, and employees.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. art. 29.1.
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 29.3 (“The Board shall develop a remuneration policy and packages that provide
incentive for the employees and management of the Company to always perform in the best interests of
the Company. This policy should take into consideration the long term performance of the Company.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 94, at 5.
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2. Enforcement Mechanism
There are two sources of law regarding director fiduciary duties in
Qatar, both of which are mentioned briefly above. The first source, the
Companies Law, is explicitly enforceable through litigation. The second
source, the Code, consists of recommendations, which are not technically
enforceable in court, but require listed entities to “voluntarily comply” or
explain in a public filing why the company has failed to comply.130 The
Code is therefore “soft-law” and is based on “comply[ing] or explain[ing]
the reason for non-compliance.”131 In this regard, the listing rules are
similar to the United Kingdom’s corporate governance code.132 Though the
“comply or explain” approach is the hallmark of corporate governance in
the European Union,133 and has been widely imitated by other jurisdictions,
the doctrine has also been criticized.134
The next section will discuss “hard” and “soft” law relating to director
obligations in Qatar for shareholding companies. The section will focus on
the parameters of the responsibilities of Qatari directors and discuss aspects
involving the duty of care which should be amended.

130. Pursuant to Art. 30 of the Code, publicly traded companies are required to file a corporate
governance report that includes compliance with the Code’s governance guidelines. QFMA
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, art. 30. Under Art. 2.2, companies are required to
comply, or explain the reason for non-compliance with the Code’s governance recommendations. Id.
art. 2.2.
131. Id.
132. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4 (2014), https://
www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code2014.aspx (“The ‘comply or explain’ approach is the trademark of corporate governance in the UK. It
has been in operation since the Code’s beginnings and is the foundation of its flexibility. It is strongly
supported by both companies and shareholders and has been widely admired and imitated
internationally.”)
133. For an example of the comply and explain approach, see Council Directive 2006/46/EC, art.
46a, 2006 O.J. (L 224).
134. See Petra Inwinkl et al., The Comply-or-Explain Principle: Stakeholders’ Views on How to
Improve the “Explain” Approach, 12 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 210, 210 (2015) (“An
increasing number of studies provide evidence that corporate governance statements disclosed on
European stock markets lack quality, mainly in terms of the explanations they include when the
companies do not comply with code provisions.”); Konstantinos Sergakis, EU Corporate Governance:
A New Supervisory Mechanism for the ‘Comply or Explain’ Principle?, 10 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L.
REV. 394, 394 (2013). (“[T]he ‘comply or explain’ principle upon which the European framework has
embarked seems to present, in its current dimension, a series of problems regarding its effectiveness.”).
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III. QATARI LAW AND QSE RULES: THE HARD AND SOFT LEGAL
PILLARS THAT SHAPE DIRECTOR OBLIGATIONS FOR
SHAREHOLDING COMPANIES
This Article focuses on one type of business entity: shareholding
companies that trade on the Qatar Exchange.135 Companies that trade on the
Qatar Exchange are generally the large and influential private-sector
businesses, including financial, insurance, construction, real estate, and
industrial companies.136 There are two primary sources of law that define
the extent and contours of director obligations in Qatar for shareholding
companies: the Companies Law and the Qatar Exchange Code.
A. The Companies Law
Considered “hard” law, the Companies Law of 2002 outlines the
obligations of directors in Qatari shareholding companies.137 Directors have
two independent duties. First, they are obligated to act loyally to the
company. Acts of disloyalty are strictly forbidden.138 Second, by making
clear that directors have non-exculpatory liability for “mistakes” resulting
in damages to the company or its shareholders, the Companies Law
imposes a non-delegable or indemnifiable obligation of due care on the
directors.139
1. The Duty of Loyalty
The Companies Law prohibits directors from engaging in conduct that
raises questions regarding loyalty such as participating in competing
businesses, engaging in self-interested transactions, obtaining cash loans
from the company, or exploiting insider information. This duty of loyalty
exists vis-à-vis both the company and its shareholders.140
In addition, directors are not allowed to engage in business
transactions with the company because they would be on both sides of such

135. This business was selected as it represents the most likely business organization that
foreigners would choose to invest in and represent the largest and most influential companies in Qatar.
136. See Website Links of QE Listed Companies, QATAR STOCK EXCH., http://www.qe.com.qa/
pps/PortalTemplates/complinks/CompaniesPopupUrl.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (providing the
names and links to the websites of companies listed on the Qatar Exchange).
137. See generally Commercial Companies Law, supra note 15. As noted supra note 35, we are
focusing only on shareholding companies although the Companies Law also promulgates regulations
for a variety of other business organizations.
138. Commercial Companies Law, supra note 15, arts. 107–10 (prohibiting various conflicts of
interest, including insider trading).
139. E.g., id. arts. 112–16, 125, 300.
140. Id. art. 107.
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transactions.141 Moreover, the CEO and directors are precluded from “any
direct or indirect interest in the contracts, projects, undertakings made on
account of the company”142 and from taking out cash loans from the
company.143 Insider trading is also strictly prohibited.144 The Companies
Law prohibits the CEO and any director from making use of knowledge
and information acquired in his capacity as a director or company
employee to attain the advancement of his personal interests or those of his
relatives.145 Violation of the duty of loyalty will result in joint and several
liability for a director.146 No director may be exculpated by internal
company rules.147
2. Due Care
In addition to prohibiting disloyal conduct, the Companies Law
mandates that directors act with due care, and makes directors liable for
“mistakes.” The due care requirement is imposed by two sources. The first
is Article 103 which mandates that the directors meet at least every two
months.148 The second source is Article 112 which provides both that the
directors are jointly responsible for managerial mistakes and that any
company provision obviating such liability is null and void.149 By imposing
joint liability on directors who make mistakes and by making that liability
non-exculpatory, the law incentivizes Qatari directors to act with great
caution.
Notably, the term “mistake” is not defined. Because the notion of a
mistake is obviously fact dependent, the potential liability is far-reaching
and possibly draconian. The directors of a Qatari shareholding company are
liable for damages for “mistakes,” i.e., negligence.150 All directors are
liable except those directors who objected.151

141. Id. art. 108.
142. Id.
143. Id. art. 109.
144. Id. art. 110.
145. Id.
146. See id. art. 112 (“The board chairman and the members will be collectively responsible for
compensating the company, shareholders and others for the damage resulted from deceit or bad use of
authority or the violation to the provisions of this law or the statute of the company and any mistake in
the management. Any term in contrary will be null and void.”).
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 103.
149. Id. art. 112.
150. The definition of negligence or examples of the same do not appear.
151. Commercial Companies Law, supra note 15, art. 113.
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The fact that ordinary negligence is actionable in Qatar is in marked
contrast with Delaware law, which does not impose liability for routine
mistakes or ordinary negligence. In fact, Delaware law protects directors
who make mistakes through the application of the business judgment rule
(“BJR”). The BJR presumes that directors acted with due care, loyalty and
good faith.152
Furthermore, under Qatari law, the company is vested with the
authority to file a damages suit. If the company fails to do so, injured
shareholders can opt to file a claim themselves.153 Pursuant to the
Companies Law, the company can file suit alleging director misconduct for
mistakes that result in damages on behalf of the shareholders within five
years from the mistake.154
Another significant difference between Qatari and Delaware law is
that the Companies Law explicitly makes this potential liability for
damages not voidable. According to the Companies Law, any provision in
the internal laws of the company that purports to prevent a shareholder
from filing suit is “null and void.”155 This Law clearly prohibits an
exculpatory clause and obviates the potential for indemnification by the
company.156 In contrast, under Delaware law, directors can be indemnified
or benefit from exculpatory clauses for violations of due care.157
B. QSE Listing Rules
The second pillar of director regulation in Qatar is the Code, which is
soft law.158 The Qatar Financial Market Authority (QFMA) introduced the
Corporate Governance Code in 2009.159 The Code applies to all
corporations whose shares are listed on the Qatar Exchange.160 As with the
152. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”).
153. Commercial Companies Law, supra note 15, art. 115.
154. Id. art. 114.
155. Id. art. 115.
156. As a possible alternative, Director and Officer Liability insurance is available for Qatari
directors. See generally BusinessGuard Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, Am. Fin. Grp.
[AIG], http://www.aig.com.qa/business/products/financial-lines/directors-officers-liability (last visited
Nov. 12, 2015).
157. See infra Part V.C. However, Delaware prohibits such exoneration or indemnification in cases
of bad faith or disloyalty. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
158. See generally QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94. The Corporate
Governance Code of Qatar “comprises principles and practices to improve the quality of governance.”
Id. at 4.
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 2.1.

2. SLAWOTSKY TRUBY (DO NOT DELETE)

364

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/9/2016 4:03 PM

Vol. 26:337

New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the London Stock Exchange,
the privilege of being listed on the Qatar Exchange is conditioned on
following the rules of the exchange.161
At the outset, the Code describes the risks of substandard corporate
governance and specifically enumerates the classic agency conflicts of
looting and shirking.162 Like the Companies Law, the Code also enumerates
the fiduciary duties of directors in Qatar. The Code states that a director
“owes the Company the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and compliance
with the rules set out in related laws and regulations including this Code
and the Board Charter.”163 In addition, the Code mandates that Directors
conduct their activities “in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in
the best interests of the Company and all shareholders”164 and “act
effectively to fulfill their responsibilities towards the Company.”165
In requiring directors to “act effectively,” the Code does not articulate
specific conduct such as consulting with experts, and engaging in due
diligence. One problem with both the Companies Law and the Code is that
neither articulates a test for identifying the sort of “mistakes” that would
expose a director to liability for regular negligence. Moreover, the Code is
voluntary and Code’s enforcement is relegated to the “comply or disclose”
model which has been subject to a fair amount of critique.166
The Code also includes a definition of loyalty and states: “Board
Members owe a Duty of Loyalty to the Company and its Shareholders. This
fiduciary duty requires Board Members to subordinate their personal
interests to the interests of the Company and its Shareholders and at all
times act in good faith.”167 In addition, the Code states that directors (and
friends and family) should not enter into self-dealing transactions with the

161. See generally New York Stock Exchange Listing Requirements, N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); NASDAQ, INITIAL LISTING
GUIDE (2015), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf; LONDON STOCK EXCH., MAIN
MARKET: A GUIDE TO LISTING ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE (2010), http://www.londonstock
exchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/documents/brochures/gudetolisting.pdf.
162. See QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, at 5 (“[B]oard members have
more control and information about the plans and operations of the company than ordinary
Shareholders. The possession of more control and more information generates opportunities for using
such control and information for obtaining personal benefits at the expense of Shareholders. And so
such asymmetries expose the Shareholders to high risks of shirking and lax performance by Board
members and Executive Managers; as well as using information and power for personal benefits at the
expense of Shareholders.”)
163. Id. art. 6.1.
164. Id. art. 6.2.
165. Id. art. 6.3.
166. See generally Inwinkl et al., supra note 134.
167. QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, Annex 2, ¶ 3.2.1.
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company, compete with the financial interests of the company,168 exploit
for their own interests a corporate opportunity (unless declined by the
company), obtain loans on a preferential basis, engage in insider trading, or
otherwise act contrary to law.169 Furthermore, directors must disclose
conflicts of interest and decline to vote on matters that present such
conflicts.
In summary, there are two major differences between Qatari law and
Delaware law. First, under Qatari “hard” law (the Companies Law),
directors are liable for a mistake. Mistake is not defined and can encompass
a virtually unlimited variety of negligence. In addition, the Companies Law
prohibits directors from benefitting from exculpatory clauses.
IV. DELAWARE LAW
The remaining question is whether Qatar’s legal framework governing
directors is optimal. Numerous opinions have been issued in Delaware and
a series of standards have been developed for evaluating director
conduct.170 Therefore, Delaware law is useful in examining Qatari law.
In a fascinating article, Curtis Milhaupt describes how Japan has
integrated Delaware judicial opinions into its own law.171 Milhaupt notes

168. Id., Annex 2, ¶ 3.2.2(1–2). It should be noted that the phrase “this paragraph does not prohibit
a concerned party from owning less than 10% of a listed company or instances where the conflict is
disclosed and expressly approved in accordance with the law, rules or regulations” dilutes this aspect of
the Corporate Governance Code. See id.
169. Id., Annex 2, ¶ 3.2.2(6–7).
170. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 654 (Del. 2014) (noting that in controlling
owner transactions a special committee of disinterested directors and a majority approval of minority
shareholders will avoid entire fairness scrutiny); Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2008)
(recognizing that directors have a duty of loyalty precluding their appearing on both sides of a
transaction or deriving a unique benefit not received by ordinary shareholders); Guttman v. Huang, 823
A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[A] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she
acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”); Malone v. Brincat,
722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“An underlying premise for the imposition of fiduciary duties is a separation
of legal control from beneficial ownership.”); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (emphasizing that directors are obligated to maximize shareholder-value); see Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (noting that directors must be fully informed prior to making a
decision and gross negligence removes the protection of the business judgement rule); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985) (holding that an enhanced scrutiny standard
will be utilized when the potential of conflicts of interest exists, for example in defending against a
takeover); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“There is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (holding that the entire fairness standard looks at the price and
procedure in arriving at a deal in evaluating director conduct).
171. See generally Curtis Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005).
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that Japanese corporate governance has relied upon certain aspects of
Delaware law, specifically in the context of defensive measures against
takeovers.172 According to Milhaupt, a focus group of Japanese scholars
concluded that Delaware law provides a “superior means” of advancing
corporate governance.173 Their “objective was to identify the best standard
by which to distinguish corporate value-enhancing from value-destroying
bids.”174 After examining takeover law from the US, UK, and EU,
“Delaware takeover doctrine emerged . . . as the superior means of
accomplishing that objective.”175 Subsequently, a “version of the Revlon
rule is reflected in the [Japanese] Takeover Guidelines, which emphasize
directors’ fiduciary duty to evaluate competing proposals and to refrain
from implementing defensive measures that deprive shareholders of the
opportunity to consider competing proposals.”176
Since Delaware law is a global authority, often providing guidance “to
courts in other jurisdictions in establishing their own [] law,”177 we analyze
Qatari law through the lens of Delaware law. Accordingly, the following
discussion of the director duty of care and the business judgment rule will
focus on Delaware law. In reviewing the decisions of directors in the
context of the duty of care, Delaware courts use the BJR. The BJR is a
rebuttable presumption that in the absence of potential or actual conflicts of
interests the directors acted in good faith and in the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders in handling the affairs of the business. The
principle acts to protect directors from personal liability if they acted
loyally and in good faith, with due care and within their authority. The BJR
standard is deferential to the directors, and a court will not second guess the
director’s business decision even if it is subsequently found to be
negligent.178 The BJR is accordingly of critical importance to directors as it

172. Id. at 2196.
173. Id. at 2196 n.82 (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of
Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007).
178. Only conduct that constitutes an uninformed decision will invalidate the BJR. For example,
say an energy company decides to buy existing oil fields paying the seller a price based upon a financial
analysis that crude will trade at $100 per barrel over the next five years. The directors engaged with
economic experts and obtained several investment banks opinions that opined oil would average at least
$100 per barrel for the next five years. However, soon after the transaction, the global economy enters
a recession and the price of oil plunges to $50 a barrel. The profitability of the fields collapse, the
company suffers losses and cuts the dividend. The decision to buy the fields now appears to have been
a bad business decision. While the decision to pay based on $100 a barrel crude was a mistake, the BJR
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absolves them of liability for the “wrong” decision. A court employing the
BJR and finding no reason to overcome the defense will dismiss litigation
against the directors.179
However, the BJR presumption can be overcome if director
misconduct is shown. The party alleging that the BJR ought not apply bears
a heavy burden.180 If the plaintiff can demonstrate that the action of the
directors was, at a minimum, grossly negligent,181 or was made without any
rational basis,182 the BJR is not applicable and the director may be held
personally liable.
The question of director liability for a lack of care and due diligence
was illustrated in the landmark case Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors must adequately inform
themselves of the facts before acting and that failure to do so obviates the
BJR.183 In Van Gorkom, the directors approved the transaction based upon
the CEO’s verbal presentation, without being provided any written material
on the proposed deal, and failed to consult outside investment banking
experts or any independent legal opinions.184 The court found that because
the directors failed to educate themselves about the proposed transaction,
the directors had failed to reach an informed opinion.185 Thus, the court
noted that the directors who voted in favor of the transaction under those
circumstances were, at a minimum, grossly negligent.186 The court
emphasized that due care mandated that the directors make an informed
decision. Therefore, the court held the directors could not avail themselves

will protect the decision since the directors engaged with experts and exercised due diligence in
reaching what was an informed business decision.
179. See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 654 (Del. 2014) (utilizing the BJR to
dismiss the suit).
180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
181. Alternatively, courts use a “no rational reason” test. See Kahn, 88 A.3d at 654 (Del. 2014)
(“Under that [BJR] standard, the claims against the Defendants must be dismissed unless no rational
person could have believed that the merger was favorable to MFW’s minority stockholders.”).
182. Id.
183. 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.1985).
184. Id. at 869.
185. See id. at 877 (noting the failure to obtain expert opinions: “Here, the issue is whether the
directors informed themselves as to all information that was reasonably available to them. Had they
done so, they would have learned of the source and derivation of the $55 price and could not reasonably
have relied thereupon in good faith”).
186. See id. at 874 (“The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom’s
role in forcing the ‘sale’ of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a minimum,
were grossly negligent in approving the ‘sale’ of the Company upon two hours’ consideration, without
prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.”).
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of the BJR. The court ultimately held that the directors failed to fulfill their
duty of care and found them personally liable.187
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide provides another method of rebutting the
188
BJR.
In Kahn, the court noted, “[W]here business judgment
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it
cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.”189 The case, one of
first impression, dealt with the appropriate standard of review for a
transaction between a controlling owner and the company if both a special
committee reviews and approves the deal and a majority of the minority
shareholders approve the transaction. The court held that under such
circumstances, the BJR was the correct standard (as opposed to entire
fairness).190
The definition of due care contained in the Code mirrors the
benchmarks applied in Van Gorkom.191 The Code states that directors must
act in good faith and exercise due care and diligence. Directors are charged
with acting in the best interests of the company, on an informed basis, after
consultation with experts when applicable, and should be informed and be
able to monitor the company.192
Following the Van Gorkom ruling, directors were concerned that they
would face personal liability for business decisions and potential personal
financial loss.193 As a result, Delaware (and many other states), enacted a
law empowering shareholders to approve exculpatory clauses protecting
directors from certain lawsuits. 194
Delaware law permits the limitation of directors’ personal liability for
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.195 Specifically, DEL.
CODE ANN Section 102(b)(7) allows company shareholders to include a
clause in a corporation’s charter precluding the personal liability of a
director for a breach of fiduciary duty.196 However, the limitation on

187. This ruling spurred the enactment of exculpatory clauses, which absolve directors for certain
forms of conduct. Such clauses are discussed infra text and notes 202–06.
188. 88 A.3d 635, 646 (Del. 2014).
189. Id. at 654 n.41 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
190. See infra text and notes 214–18 (discussing the entire fairness standard).
191. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
192. QFMA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, Annex 2, ¶ 3.1.2.
193. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
287, 289 (2008) (noting that after Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature enacted a law that permitted
corporation shareholders to protect directors from such liability and that 98% of surveyed Fortune 500
companies has adopted exculpatory provisions).
194. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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personal liability may not eliminate liability: (1) for “any breach of the
director’s duty of loyalty,” (2) “for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law,” or
(3) “for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.”197 Therefore, such exculpatory clauses cannot be invoked
in situations where the directors acted disloyally, in bad faith or in
furtherance of self-interest.198 Notwithstanding these limitations,
exculpatory clauses are highly beneficial to directors and obviate liability
for duty of care violations.199
In addition, Delaware courts will not apply the BJR in certain
contexts. Where potential or actual conflicts of interest are present, other
more stringent standards are applicable. For example, when directors enact
anti-takeover measures, the Delaware courts will utilize the “enhanced
scrutiny” standard to address “the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders.”200 In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining,201 the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that courts must evaluate director conduct
taking into account the potential positional conflict of interest by requiring
the directors to establish (1) “that the threatened takeover posed a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness, and [(2)] that the defensive measures
adopted are reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”202 The target
directors must satisfy these prerequisites by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation before they can enjoy the presumptions afforded
by the business judgment rule. Delaware law thus “plac[es] upon the
directors the burden of proving that they have not acted solely or primarily
out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office.”203 Similar duties—
known as Revlon duties—are imposed in a change of control situation.204
As noted above, Revlon requires that when a control change is inevitable or

197. Id.
198. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001).
199. See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1179–80 (Del.
2015) (finding company independent directors can invoke exculpatory clauses and are entitled to
dismissal of duty of care claims). Of course, shareholders can benefit as well by providing discretion to
directors to act as long as they do so in good faith. See also Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772,
777 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding exculpatory clauses “encourage directors to undertake risky, but
potentially value-maximizing, business strategies, so long as they do so in good faith.”).
200. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
201. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
202. Id. at 1341 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954).
203. Id.
204. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (finding director
misconduct in failing to seek highest price available).
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the decision has been made to sell the company, the directors are charged
with obtaining the highest price for the shareholders.205
Another standard applied by Delaware courts is known as entire
fairness. The standard is triggered when actual conflicts of interest arise—
for example, when directors stand on both sides of a transaction or when a
controlling shareholder206 is engaged in a transaction with the company.207
Pursuant to this standard, the court will evaluate the conduct to ensure the
shareholders were treated with entire fairness with regard to both process
and price.208 The test is taken together as a whole and not broken up or
bifurcated. In a recent case, the Delaware Supreme Court updated this
standard so that when both (1) a truly independent committee negotiates
and approves a transaction and (2) the deal is approved by an informed vote
of the majority of the minority shareholders, the court will use the BJR
instead of entire fairness.209
V. EXAMINING QATARI LAW THROUGH A DELAWARE LENS
The next section discusses several proposals for the development of
corporate law in Qatar. These proposals are specific to the due care context
where no actual conflicts have arisen and in the absence of bad faith or
disloyalty.210 We believe that these suggestions balance the need to redress
truly errant director decision-making and simultaneously remove liability
for merely negligent conduct, thereby facillitating the retention of the best
directors.
Directors play a decisive role in publicly-traded companies. Attracting
qualified individuals may be difficult if directors face significant personal
liability for business decisions. Lawsuits alleging director misconduct,
while currently unheard of in Qatar, may be actualized in the coming years.
As the Qatari economy diversifies and the shareholder base widens,
shareholders will begin to challenge director decisions. Moreover, as
economic activity picks up, so will director decision-making. In Delaware,
205. Id. at 184.
206. A shareholder does not have to be a majority owner to be a controlling owner. See Kahn v.
Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del.1994).
207. For example, selling a subsidiary to the company, see generally Americas Mining v.
Therault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012), or going private, see generally Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88
A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
208. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
209. Kahn, 88 A.3d at 645.
210. Enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness are applicable in certain contexts where actual or
potential conflicts exist. Our discussion only focuses on standard business making decisions and due
care. We point out that in other situations such as takeovers, defensive measure taking and going
private transactions.
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courts review almost every major transaction because in almost all cases a
shareholder lawsuit is filed.211 If shareholder suits increase in Qatar and
directors are personally liable for simple mistakes, it will hinder a
company’s ability to obtain and retain the best directors. No corporation
can be a success unless led by competent and energetic officers and
directors. Such individuals would be unwilling to serve if exposed to the
broad range of potential liability and legal costs inherent in such service
despite the most scrupulous regard for the interests of stockholders.212
Unless Qatar’s current regime is reformed, attracting and retaining top
talent will be difficult because liability for “mistake” is currently openended and undefined. It is therefore crucial for Qatar to implement superior
corporate governance to encourage the most talented directors to lead
publicly traded companies. As noted earlier, an academic study of five
GCC nations found Qatari governance at the lower end. Qatar would
benefit from improved governance and a known stable business law
environment in two ways. First, such an environment would certainly
encourage foreign investors (and domestic ones) to invest their capital in
Qatar. Second, it would assist in attracting and retaining the most highly
qualified individuals to serve as Qatari directors.
Delaware provides substantially more protection for directors
regarding liability for decision making. In contrast to Qatar, which allows
for director liability for “mere mistake,” the risk of personal liability for
Delaware directors (presuming no bad faith or disloyalty) is low. Delaware
courts strictly apply the business judgment rule, and the Delaware
legislature has enacted additional defenses—the “three legged stool” of
exculpatory clauses, insurance and indemnification rights.213
Therefore, there is a need to update Qatari law so that Qatari directors
are not faced with immense personal liability for merely negligent
decisions. The next sub-sections make three proposals to enhance Qatari
corporate governance.

211. Hals, supra note 34.
212. Hermelin v. K-V Harm. Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1094 (Del. Ch. 2012).
213. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 819 (2001) (citation
omitted).
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A. The Need for a Qatari Business Judgment Rule
The BJR can be found in one form or another in many advanced legal
systems besides the United States.214 The doctrine’s absence from Qatar is
significant. Qatar needs a BJR for two reasons. First, the BJR allows for
reasonable risk taking and directors need to have peace of mind that
reasonable decisions that turn out to be mistakes will not automatically lead
to liability. Without such an incentive, Qatari directors will likely be overly
cautious and concerned about taking justified entrepreneurial risks.
Excessive anxiety over business decision making is not ideal. Particularly
in today’s fast-paced globalized marketplace, extreme caution and
reluctance to act may disadvantage a business.215 In other words, “it is very
much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for
overly cautious corporate decisions.”216 Yet, director discretion cannot be
open-ended and limitless. In Delaware, the BJR can be overcome by
demonstrating either disloyalty, bad faith or conduct constituting more than
“mere negligence.”217 Another method of rebutting the BJR is the “no
rational purpose” test.218 Thus, a BJR aligns the directors’ risk liability with
shareholders’ need for companies to engage in reasonable risk taking.
The second factor militating in favor of a Qatari BJR is that without
one directors will be deterred from serving on boards. As detailed above,
there is no Qatari provision for indemnification and no exculpatory clauses
are permitted. The personal liability risk of directors—absent a BJR—is
therefore draconian.219 Moreover, jurisdictions such as Delaware not only
have a BJR but also permit exculpatory clauses and companies often
provide indemnification and Director & Officer liability insurance.
Excessive personal liability risk will restrain directors from reasonable risktaking and will raise insurance and indemnification costs.220 In Qatar, the
absence of exculpatory clauses militates strongly in favor of a BJR.

214. Randy, J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Judgement Rule: International Variations, THE
GLOBAL DELAWARE BLOG (Apr. 9, 2015), http://global.blogs.delaware.gov/2015/04/09/delawaresbusiness-judgment-rule-international-variations/.
215. Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187,
1189 (1986).
216. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
217. See infra Section V.B.
218. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 654 (Del. 2014) (“[W]here business judgment
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
219. Only the extent of D&O insurance alleviates the risk of extensive personal liability.
220. Langevoort, supra note 213, at 818.
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B. Imposing Liability for Conduct other than Mere Mistake/Negligence
In addition to enacting a BJR, Qatari law should define what conduct
is sufficient to rebut the BJR defense and under what circumstances the
BJR is not applicable. Qatari law should define “mistake,” i.e., negligence,
and specify what level of “mistake” is sufficient to overcome the BJR. The
benchmark should, at a minimum, include grossly negligent conduct like
the uninformed business decision that formed the basis of the Van Gorkom
ruling.221 An additional method of overcoming the BJR would be a
business decision “having no rational purpose.”222 Regardless of the
standard, the law should make clear that directors will not be held
personally liable for routine mistakes and must articulate a criterion to
guide courts in evaluating duty of care violation claims.
C. Companies Should Be Empowered to Allow Exculpatory Clauses
In Delaware, companies are empowered to amend the articles of
incorporation to permit shareholders to approve corporate exculpatory
clauses. Such provisions are not applicable when the misconduct was
tainted by bad faith, disloyalty or self-interest.223 Exculpatory clauses
provide a defense for directors and plaintiffs cannot file suits when a mere
duty of care violation is alleged.224 Thus, under Delaware law, director
conduct that is merely reckless, but not consciously or intentionally so, can
be exculpated by a section 102(b)(7).225 Exculpatory clauses help attract the
best directors and “encourage[s] directors to undertake risky, but
potentially value-maximizing, business strategies, so long as they do so in
good faith.”226

221. This would back up the definition in the Corporate Governance Code. According to the
Code, “A Board Member must take reasonable steps to be fully aware of all relevant issues, including
engaging in due diligence, such as consulting outside independent experts when appropriate, and to
make informed and independent decisions when voting on Company matters. In addition to the
obligation to be informed on Company decisions and matters, the duty of care also requires Board
members to take reasonable steps to monitor the Company’s management and finances.” QFMA
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 94, Annex 2, ¶ 3.1.2.
222. E.g., Kahn, 88 A.3d at 654.
223. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
224. Note that exculpatory clauses in Delaware only apply to directors not corporate officers
(unless they serve as directors as well and the alleged misconduct was in the capacity of director). Id.
225. Id.; see In re Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175–76
(Del. 2015) ( “A plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a
director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless
of the underlying standard of review for the board’s conduct—be it Revlon, Unocal, the entire fairness
standard, or the business judgment rule.”).
226. See Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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The BJR provides yet another safeguard against personal financial
liability and fortify the BJR. In contrast, Qatar’s Companies Law leaves no
room for an exculpatory clause and allows suits for ordinary mistakes. To
both attract top directors, as well as encourage prudent risk-taking, Qatar
should consider embracing exculpatory clauses. This would mean adopting
a rule permitting shareholders to include a clause in a corporation’s charter
eliminating the possibility that a director could be held personally liable to
shareholders for the breach of fiduciary obligations exempting liability for:
“any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty . . . for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law . . . and for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.”227
The three suggestions outlined above are designed to empower Qatari
directors to act without undue concern about potential personal financial
liability. This would facilitate the emboldened entrepreneurial conduct
needed to successfully compete in a global business climate. However, the
freedom would not be unlimited; directors would have the responsibility to
act in an informed and knowledgeable manner, and in the best interests of
the company and its shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Qatar has embarked on an ambitious plan to diversify and build a
knowledge-based economy to gain financial prominence. An integral
component of this far-reaching effort is the creation of strong capital
markets that will attract both domestic and foreign investment. Corporate
governance plays an essential role in attracting and retaining capital.
Important corporate governance questions focus on the fiduciary duties of
directors, namely, the extent of those obligations, and to whom the duties
are owed.
The question of whether governance is stakeholder-centric or
shareholder-centric is crucial in evaluating these questions. In the United
States, directors owe obligations to the corporation and its owners—the
shareholders. In Europe and Japan, the focus on stakeholders other than
shareholders empowers boards (or obligates them) to take into account
various interests such as the community, customers and suppliers. While
some introductory language references other stakeholders, nothing in the
Companies Law or Code in Qatar specifically empowers directors to
embrace stakeholder interests. Moreover, the conflicts listed in the Code
resemble the conflicts common in the United States. The Qatari model thus
227. § 102(b)(7).
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mirrors the United States governance structure. Therefore, a comparison
with the leading jurisdiction in the United States—Delaware—is called for
in analyzing the fiduciary duties of Qatari directors.
Pursuant to Qatari law, directors are liable for duty of care violations
for mistaken business decisions. Qatari law makes these duties nondelegable and non-exculpatory. In comparison with Delaware, Qatari
director obligations are potentially riskier to directors in terms of personal
liability. Unlike Delaware, Qatari directors are liable for mere negligence.
Qatar would benefit from a modification of the current legal
architecture regulating director conduct and liability for duty of care
violations. Qatar should enact a business judgment rule because such a rule
is vital to creating a balanced risk taking environment. The Companies Law
should be amended and should define the conduct which will rebut the
BJR. This trigger can be conduct constituting gross negligence or a
decision for which there is no rational basis. Mere mistake or negligence
alone should not suffice to impose liability. In addition, Qatar should
consider allowing shareholders to approve exculpatory clauses which
would insulate directors from liability for duty of care violations based
upon conduct where there is no bad faith, self-interest or disloyalty. Doing
so would encourage companies to hire the most qualified directors and
would encourage the prudent risk-taking that is the hallmark of the world’s
most successful corporations.

